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I.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellee agrees with Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement set
forth in her brief.
II.
STANDARD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
While a reviewable question of law may be present, the trial
court's ruling is nevertheless based upon the evidence presented at
trial and the findings derived therefrom. It is a well-established
rule that "due to the advantaged position of the trial judge," this
court will indulge considerable deference to the findings. Tanner
v. Baadsqaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980)
III.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR RULES
Appellee submits that the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-16-1 et seq. , is of central importance to the
appeal.

A copy of the statute is reproduced and contained in the

Addendum "A" hereto.
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This was a proceeding for rule violations and for unpaid rent

that accrued during the proceedings for eviction under the Utah
1

Mobile Home Park Residence Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-1 et seq.
The matter came on for a bench trial on Wednesday, November 2,
1994, before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley in the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,

The trial court,

having considered the evidence presented by both parties during
trial, the testimony of the witnesses, and having reviewed a trial
brief submitted by Appellant Johnson, including review of the cases
cited in that brief, entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Judgment on December 2, 1994, finding for the Plaintiff
and against Defendant.1
It should be further noted that the Defendant, June Johnson,
did

not

testify

at the trial.

Appellant's

defense

at

trial

consisted of cross-examination and summation by her counsel.

(Tr.

at R. 764-796)
B.

Statement of Facts
The following statements of fact are taken from the District

Court's Findings of Fact (hereinafter

lf

FOFn) and Conclusions of Law

entered herein, a copy of which are attached as Exhibit

f, lf

E

to

Appellant's "Appendix."

1

It should be noted that defense counsel's queries and
references to Appellant's pregnancy are not properly before this
court, since the trial court found that matter to be irrelevant to
the trial issue. Any suggestion of that fact offered by Appellant
in her brief should be disregarded. See Tr. at R. 753.
2

1.

The parties entered into a lease agreement, which lease

agreement

included

as

an

attachment

all

of

the

rules

and

regulations of the mobile home park dated July l, 1992, a copy of
which was introduced into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-l."
This lease agreement was for the lease of a mobile home space known
as 255 E. Hidden View Drive, #267, Sandy, Utah.
lease

agreement

"Appendix."
2.

is

attached

as

Exhibit

!I !I

B

A copy of the
to

Appellant's

FOF, paragraph 1.

On or about May 6, 1993, a 15-day eviction notice (Trial

Exhibit "P-2") was served upon the Appellant, June Johnson, for
rule violations as set forth in the notice.

A copy of the lease

agreement is attached as Exhibit "C" to Appellant's "Appendix."
FOF, para. 2.
3.

It is the practice of Appellee to regularly enforce the

park's rules and regulations against residents, irrespective of
their religion, religious persuasion, family structure, or family
status.2
4.

FOF, para. 4.
For over a period of four (4) years, the Appellee in this

case and its predecessor in interest, was required to enforce many

Appellant Johnson had at one time during this action
maintained that her Polygamist lifestyle and practice was a
motivating factor for Crescentwood Village to force eviction.
Appellant Johnson abandoned these baseless claims at the time of
trial, and the court found there was no substance to those claims
as set forth in the trial court's Findings of Fact.
3

rule violations by the Appellant, June Johnson.

The mobile home

park endeavored to work with the Ms. Johnson to get her to abide by
the rules and regulations during the subject time period. FOF,
para. 5.
5.

The rules and regulations of the mobile home park are

reasonable and necessary to promote the health, safety, and welfare
of the park residents.
6.

FOF, para. 6.

After the Appellant was served with the 15-day notice,

she attempted to cure the rule violations as set forth in that
notice.
7.

FOF, para. 7.
The Appellant did cure the unlicensed vehicle violation

and the mobile home painting violation.
8.

FOF, para. 7.

The Appellant did much to cure the violation relating to

the condition of her lot being kept in a neat, clean, and weed free
condition.

The Appellant removed some, but not all of the garbage

and weed growth and therefore never fully cured the violation
relating to the condition of her mobile home lot.
9.

FOF, para. 8.

After the 15 day notice period expired, the Appellant

failed to maintain her yard
condition.

in a clean, neat and weed free

Appellant failed to maintain her lot by allowing

significant new growth in weeds, new garbage, trash, and other
objects accumulated on Appellant!s lot.

4

FOF, para. 9.

10.

After the expiration of the May 6, 1993 notice, the

Appellant violated on several occasions another rule of the park
relating to violation of the curfew rule for her minor son, FOF,
para 10.
11.

After the May 6, 1993 notice had expired, the Appellant

received two oral notices from the park's manager, Mr. Shupe, that
she was again failing to maintain the garbage, trash, and weeds on
her lot, which was a violation of the park rules.

These verbal

warnings were given to the Appellant in July of 1993, and the
Appellant did absolutely nothing about the warnings and ignored
them.

FOF, para. 11.
12.

The garbage, trash, and weed problems on the Appellant's

lot were ongoing in nature because of continued accumulation of
weeds, trash, and garbage.

The trial Court found that problem

continued and existed at the time when Crescentwood Village served
its notice of lease termination on August 3, 1993. The notice was
introduced as Trial Exhibit "P-3", and is attached as Exhibit n D"
to Appellant's "Appendix.".
13.

F0Ff para. 12.

The eviction notice was served after a passage of more

than sixty (60) days from the expiration of the May 5, 1993 notice,
and considering the nature of the rule violations, that was a
reasonable period of time that would not trigger or require an
additional period of cure or an additional new 15-day notice. FOF,
5

para. 12 and 13.
14.

Other residents in the mobile home park have had their

general health, safety and welfare impacted negatively as a result
of

the

Appellant's

failure

to

maintain

and

control

the

weed

problem, the trash problem, the garbage problem, and the curfew
violations by her son.
15.

FOF, para. 18.

Crescentwood Village occasionally provided its residents

additional

trash

dumpsters,

made

Appellant

aware

of

the

availability of these dumpsters for use in cleaning up her lot.
Mrs. Johnson did not take advantage of the use of these dumpsters.
FOF, para 20.
16.

Crescentwood Village engaged in no conduct that would

have led the Appellant, June Johnson, to believe that it would
waive strict compliance with the park rules, regulations, and lease
agreement.
17.

FOF, para 21.
The

notices

in

this

particular

case

v/ere

legally

sufficient, consistent with the lease agreement, and consistent
with Utah Code Annotated §57-16-5 and Utah Code Annotated §57-16-6.
FOF, para 2 3 .
18.
follow

The Appellant breached the lease agreement by failing to

the

rules

and

regulations

of

the park,

including

the

continuing nature of the violations of trash, garbage, and weeds,
as well as the curfew violations regarding her son.
6

FOF, para 29.

V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Crescentwood Village Inc. 's (lfCVIn) notices to June Johnson
were reasonable and constructive, thereby affording her with full
and satisfactory

notification of CVI's intent to terminate the

lease for park rule violations. Appellee further contends that CVI
11

temporarily waived11 its right to forfeit the lease agreement. The

subject lease provides an unequivocal non-waiver provision.
Furthermore, even assuming that acceptance of past due rent may, in
certain circumstances, constitute a waiver, the lease provides a
specific

non-waiver

provision

against

any

such

waiver.

Mrs.

Johnson was provided with sufficient notice and opportunity to
cure, and her failure to do so should not constitute a waiver on
the part of CVI.
VI.
ARGUMENT
The Appellant's issue on this appeal is whether the district
court erred in concluding that the [lessor's] gratuitous extension
of the cure period specified in its 15-day notice of default did
not require the [lessor] to provide a new, unequivocal notice that
the cure period, as extended, would expire on a date certain.3

It

Appellant's Docketing Statement - Paragraph 5 "Issues
Presented by the Appeal."
7

is presumed the foregoing issue was derived from the trial court's
Conclusions of Law (Aplt.App. Exhibit "E")

entered herein, which

specifically provides:4
2.
The Court concludes that the notices served in
this case were legally sufficient, consistent with the
lease agreement, and consistent with Utah State statutes,
including Utah Code Annotated §57-16-5 and §57-16-6.
Appellant would therefore suggest that, as a matter of law, a
gratuitous or accommodating extension of the fifteen (15) day cure
period set forth in the notice, thereafter imposes upon a landlord
a

legal

obligation

to provide

additional

notice

gratuitous or accommodating period terminates.

of

when

the

Utah law on that

point is long-settled.
This is simply not a case where a notice to cure was served
after a single incident of park rule violations.

On the contrary,

the conduct and complacency exhibited by Appellant over a period of
years became ludicrous, especially after a tremendous amount of
indulgence by the park f s management and staff.

(Tr. at R. 654)

Moreover, the lower court specifically found in its Findings of
Fact at paragraph 21:
,f

....the Plaintiff engaged in no conduct that would have
led the Defendant, June Johnson, to believe that the
Plaintiff would waive strict compliance with the park
rules, regulations, and lease agreement. This findings
Appellant has failed to include in its Brief any
reference to the record where such contention was specifically
preserved for appeal.
8

is an additional basis why the Court finds that the
Plaintiff was not required under the facts and
circumstances of this case to provide new notice or a new
opportunity to cure in this particular case after the
first 15-day notice. The Court finds that because of the
ongoing nature of the rule violations by the Defendant,
that the equitable considerations in this particular case
weigh heavily in favor of the Plaintiff and not the
Defendant, because, among other things, the evidence
clearly established that the Plaintiff had worked with
the Defendant a number of times and over a long period of
time in an effort to get her to cure rule violations,
including those rule violations which are the subject of
this particular lawsuit. There was a pattern established
that the Plaintiff tried to work with the Defendant; and,
hence, the equitable considerations in this Court's
opinion point in favor of the Plaintiff.11
Appellant is essentially asking the court to determine whether
the notices which were provided to her were sufficient under the
law, and,

if

so, whether CVI waived

its right to

forfeiture.

Appellee submits that the notices provided to the Appellant were
both reasonable and sufficient, and that no waiver of its rights
under the lease resulted from its actions.

Appellant can hardly

claim ignorance of the fact that CVI was extremely interested in
having

the

condition

Appellant

which

was

maintain
required

her
of

mobile

the

other

home

and

tenants,

lot
and

in a
more

importantly, done so expeditiously.
The case of Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, 195 P.2d 748
(Utah 1948) 5 ,

is analogous to the facts presented here, wherein

property was sold under a uniform real estate contract requiring
Appellee's Addendum

,f M

B

9

hereto.

the purchasers to pay monthly installments.

In that case, the

purchasers failed from the very beginning to make the monthly
payments as promised. For a period of approximately two (2) years,
the sellers demanded that the contract be paid up to date, and
assured

the

buyers

that

no

forfeiture

of

their

rights

was

contemplated at that time. The sellers were also quoted as saying
lf

do the best you can," referring to making up the several past-due

monthly installments.
Finally, the sellers mailed a notice to the buyers to pay the
amount in default within seven days, or forfeit under the contract.
The buyer immediately contacted the sellers and began negotiations,
which included seeking more time to bring the payments up to date.
The seller refused anything other than full payment, only because
the buyers did not even make payments from the beginning.
The matter was tried to the court, which concluded that the
sellerfs conduct was deemed to be a waiver of its rights to insist
on prompt payments, but that the seller had not waived any right to
declare a forfeiture.

The trial court also concluded that, based

upon the parties actions, the seller had not provided reasonable
notice and demand to the buyers.

This Court disagreed with the

lower court, stating:
"....The notice informed the defendants that the
plaintiff intended, after many lenities, to insist upon
its forfeiture rights under the contract at least as to
past due payments.
That the defendants understood
10

plaintiff's intentions is shown by their actions -- they
immediately began negotiations for further time in which
to bring their payments up to date.11
Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, 195 P.2d at 750 (Utah 1948).
The question before this court in Pacific Development was
whether the amount of time to cure the default was reasonable, and
in view of those circumstances, the twenty-three (23) days was
found to be sufficient.
purchasers

and

This Court, reversing a judgment for the

remanding, continued

its reasoning

concerning

adequate notice to a defaulting party, and provided further:
Repeated warnings without their strict enforcement
are, of course, indicative of a willingness to waive that
strict performance, but they also have the probative
value of a cautionary nature.
They should warn the
buyers the seller cannot continue such conduct
indefinitely. Under such circumstances the buyers should
not let themselves into a position whereby they are
forced to assume they can rely on the seller agreeing
with them as to what would be a reasonable length of time
to make up the delinquencies.
Pacific Development, supra at 751.
The import of that decision here is that Appellant should not
have assumed that CVI would permit the lease violations to go on
without electing a forfeiture. Appellant was warned of such action
in the 15-day notice and by repeated verbal warnings.

It is

undisputed that Appellant was given numerous verbal and written
warning concerning her property condition and rule violations. (Tr.
at R. 739)

These warnings went unanswered for the most part. (Tr.

at R. 740-41)

Finally, on May 6, 1993, Crescentwood Village
11

provided

the Appellant with a final opportunity

to cure the

violations. During this period, as in Pacific Development, certain
"lenities" were afforded under the circumstances, but certainly no
intention to waive any right to force eviction.

Crescentwood

Village engaged in no conduct that would have led Ms. Johnson to
believe that strict compliance with the park rules, regulations,
and lease agreement would be waived. See Findings of Fact, para 21.
The Appellant simply did not live up to her end of the bargain, and
in fact made the situation much worse by allowing more weed growth,
trash, and other oddities to pile up in her yard, including a swamp
cooler.

There is little question in this case that the Appellant

knew what was expected of her under the lease, and certainly had
constructive knowledge of the Parkfs rules which were attached to
her lease.
The undisputed fact is that even after being served with a
notice to cure the violations, Ms. Johnson received two oral
notices from Mr. Shupe that she was again failing to maintain the
garbage, trash, and weeds on her lot, which Ms. Johnson knew was a
violation of the park rules, and was the very reason she was served
the 15-day notice in the first place. (Tr. at R. 750)

Simply

stated, Ms. Johnson did absolutely nothing about those continued
warnings and elected to ignore them.

See Findings of Fact, para.

11. The Park and its other residents should not suffer the effects
12

of a tenant's complacent and indifferent attitude, especially when
that tenant has received the number and frequency of notices as did
Ms. Johnson.

While the Park allowed Ms. Johnson a degree of

tolerance, the Park maintained and voiced its position at all
times, including forfeiture.
Even if she had been afforded some "new" final date for the
cure period, her previous conduct would indicate that she could not
have cured even within that time.

To hold otherwise, under these

circumstances, would result in a tenant being able to negotiate a
gratuitous extension of the cure period, then claim a right to
further notice and opportunity to cure with a "new11 date certain.
This process could be endless and effectively leave the landlord
without adequate remedy or protection for his property.
The subject lease agreement provides a non-waiver clause which
provides:
Waiver.
No failure of Park to enforce any term
hereof shall be deemed a waiver, nor shall any acceptance
of a partial payment of rent be deemed a waiver of Park's
right to the full amount.
The aforesaid lease provision sets forth two (2) non-waiver
elements; (1) failure of the Park to enforce any term therein,
including park rules, will not result in a waiver to enforce other
terms or rules, and (2) receipt of partial payment will not waive
entitlement to full payment under the lease.
lease are unambiguous.

The terms of the

The subject lease further provides:
13

Default. Should Resident(s) fail to pay rent when
due or violate any Rule or other term or condition of
this lease, Park may elect to (a) continue the lease in
effect and enforce all its rights and remedies hereunder,
including the right to recover the rent as it becomes
due, or (b) at any time, terminate all of the Resident(s)
rights hereunder and recover from Resident(s) all damages
the Park may incur by reason of the breach of the lease.
All property on the premises is hereby subject to a lien
in favor of Park, for payment of all sums due to the
maximum extent allowed by law. (Emphasis added)
In Utah, a waiver of the seller's right to insist on prompt
payment does not destroy a right to forfeit all contract terms or
interest when lessee continually fails to perform.

Christy ex ux.

v. Guild ex ux. r 101 Utah 313, 121 P.2d 401 (1942)6.
It is undisputed that the lease agreement was entered into by
the parties. (Tr. at R. 801)

It is also undisputed that Appellant

signed the subject lease agreement.

Under Utah law, a contracting

party is under a duty to read it before signing it, and will be
considered bound by constructive knowledge of the contents thereof.
This is merely an application of fundamental contract law.

See

Theros v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 17 Utah 2d 205, 407
P.2d

685

(1965)

Furthermore,

the

Rules

of

the

park

are

incorporated within the lease, a copy of which was provided to
Appellant at the time she signed the lease.
The
11

[ujnder

Pacific
the

Development

circumstances

Appellee's Addendum

decision

of

this

lf lf

C

14

(Tr. at R. 654)

provided

further

case, we believe

hereto.

that

that
the

[defendants] were given a reasonable length of time to clear
themselves of default. There is grave doubt that they would have
been able to accomplish that goal even with a longer time." Id. at
751.
In Pincrree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317
(Utah 1976)7, the lessor initially sent a letter to lessee on
September 24, 1974, which set forth deficiencies in the maintenance
of

the

leased

premises.

The

letter

provided

deficiencies were not corrected within thirty
lessor would declare a forfeiture of the lease.

that

if the

(30) days, then
Following the

September 24, 1974, notice, there were several meetings between the
parties and the repairs were discussed.

Five (5) months later on

February 26, 1975, the lessor served notice of forfeiture of the
lease for the lesseefs failure to correct the deficiencies set
forth in the letter of September 24, 1974.

Analogous to the first

notice in the present case, the first notice in Pingree notified
the lessee to cure the deficiencies or face forfeiture.

The

parties in Pingree commenced a period of discussion amounting to a
forbearance period of approximately 150 days, which is twice the
duration of the present period of seventy days. It must be assumed
that the lessor in Pingree neither intended nor indicated that it
would waive its right to declare forfeiture. See Hackford v. Snow,
7

Appellee's Addendum

lf !!

D hereto.
15

657 P.2d
contained

1271
a

(Utah 1982)(assuming that the lease in Pinaree

strict

forfeiture

provision

when

covenants were

breached)•
There simply is no Utah decision which requires additional
notice of a date certain when a forbearance period will expire. In
fact, the law pronounced in the Pacific Development decision is
controlling, wherein a defaulting party should not presume that the
lessor will be indefinitely tolerable of continued breach•
VII.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm the trial
court's findings, conclusions, and judgment rendered

in this

matter•
DATED this 5> day of June, 1995.
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN
& BOUD, P.C.

16

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this S

day of June,

1995, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage
prepaid, to the following:

John T. Anderson
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
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Exhibit A

57-15-10

RKAL ESTATE
rOLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah L a w Review. — Attorney's Fees in
Utah, 1984 Utah L Rev 553

57-15-10. Severability of provisions.
If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter shall not
be impaired thereby.
History: C. 1953, 57-15-10, e n a c t e d b y L.
1981, ch. 224, § 11.

57-15-11. Limitation
clauses.

on

enforcement

of

due-on-sale

After October 15, 1985, this chapter applies to any instrument described in
Section 57-15-2 that:
(1) was originated in this state by a financial institution other t h a n a
national bank, a federal savings and loan association, a federal thrift
institution, or a federal credit union; and
(2) was made or assumed during the period beginning on May 12, 1981,
and ending on October 15, 1982.
History: C. 1953, 57-15-11, e n a c t e d b y L.
1985, ch. 2, § 1.

CHAPTER 16
MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY
Section
57-16-1.
57-16-2.
57-16-3.
57-16-4.

57-16-5.
57-16-6.
57-16-7.
57-16-8.

Section
Short title.
Purpose of chapter.
Definitions.
Termination of lease or rental
agreement — Required contents of lease — Increases in
rents or fees — Sale of homes.
Grounds for terminating lease.
Action for lease termination —
Prerequisite procedure.
Rules of parks.
Payment of rent and fees during

57-16-9.
57-16-10.

57-16-11.
57-16-12.
57-16-15.1.

pendency of eviction proceeding.
Lienholder's liability for rent
and fees.
Utility service to mobile home
parks — Limitation on providers' charges.
Rights and remedies not exclusive.
Waiver of rights and duties prohibited.
Eviction proceeding.

57-16-1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Mobile Home P a r k
Residency Act."
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 1.
M e a n i n g of "this act." — The term "This
act" in this section means L. 1981, ch. 178, §§ 1

through 12, which enacted §§ 57-16-1 through
57-16-12.

402

MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY

57-16-3

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 54 Am. Jur. 2d Mobile
Homes, Trailer Parks, and Tourist Camps § 1
et seq.
C.J.S. — 39A C.J.S. Health and Environ-

ment § 31; 60 C.J S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
Key Numbers. — Health and Environment
«=> 32.

57-16-2. Purpose of chapter.
The fundamental right to own and protect land and to establish conditions
for its use by others necessitate that the owner of a mobile home park be
provided with speedy and adequate remedies against those who abuse the
terms of a tenancy. The high cost of moving mobile homes, the requirements of
mobile home parks relating to their installation, and the cost of landscaping
and lot preparation necessitate t h a t the owners of mobile homes occupied
within mobile home parks be provided with protection from actual or constructive eviction. It is the purpose of this chapter to provide protection for both the
owners of mobile homes located in mobile home parks and for the owners of
mobile home parks.
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Validity of zoning or building regulations restricting mobile homes or trailers to
established mobile home or trailer parks, 17
A.L.R.4th 106.
Validity and construction of restrictive cove-

57-16-3.

nant prohibiting or governing outside storage
or parking of house trailers, motor homes,
campers, vans, and the like, in residential
neighborhoods, 32 A.L.R.4th 651.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Mobile home" means a transportable structure in one or more
sections with the plumbing, heating, and electrical systems contained
within the unit, which when erected on a site, may be used with or without
a permanent foundation as a family dwelling.
(2) "Mobile home park" means any tract of land on which two or more
mobile home spaces leased, or offered for lease or rent, to accommodate
mobile homes for residential purposes.
(3) "Resident" means an individual who leases or rents space in a
mobile home park.
(4) "Mobile home space" means a specific area of land within a mobile
home park designed to accommodate one mobile home.
(5) "Rent" means charges paid for the privilege of occupying a mobile
home space, and may include service charges and fees.
(6) "Service charges" means separate charges paid for the use of
electrical and gas service improvements which exist at a mobile home
space, or for t r a s h removal, sewage and water, or any combination of the
above.
(7) "Fees" means other charges incidental to a resident's tenancy
including, but not limited to, late fees, charges for pets, charges for storage
of recreational vehicles, charges for the use of park facilities, and security
deposits.
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(8) "Change of use" means a change oi the use of a mobile home park, or
any part of it, for a purpose other than the rental of mobile home spaces.
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, * :*.

57-16-4. Termination of lease or r e n t a l agreement — Required contents of lease — Increases in r e n t s or
fees — Sale of homes,
(1) A mobile home park or its agents may not terminate a lease or rental
agreement upon any ground other than as specified in this chapter.
(2) Each agreement for the lease of mobile home space shall be written and
signed by the parties. Each lease shall contain at least the following information:
(a) the name and address of the mobile home park owner and any
persons authorized to act for the owner, upon whom notice and service of
process may be served;
(b) the type of the leasehold, and whether it be term or periodic;
(c) a full disclosure of all rent, service charges, and other fees presently
being charged on a periodic basis;
(d) the date or dates on which the payment of rent, fees, and service
charges are due; and
(e) all rules t h a t pertain to the mobile home park which, if broken, may
constitute grounds for eviction.
(3) Increases in rent or fees for periodic tenancies shall be unenforceable
until 60 days after notice of the increase is mailed to the resident. If service
charges are not included in the rent, service charges may be increased during
the leasehold period after notice to the resident is given, and increases or
decreases in electricity rates shall be passed through to the resident. Increases
or decreases in the total cost of other service charges shall be passed through
to the resident.
The mobile home park may not alter the date or dates on which rent, fees,
and service charges are due unless a 60-day written notice precedes the
alteration.
(4) Any rule or condition of a lease purporting to prevent or unreasonably
limit the sale of a mobile home belonging to a resident is void and unenforceable. The mobile home park may, however, reserve the right to approve the
prospective purchaser of a mobile home who intends to become a resident, but
such approval may not be unreasonably withheld. The mobile home park may
require proof of ownership as a condition of approval. The mobile home park
may unconditionally refuse to appiove any purchaser of a mobile home who
does not register prior to purchase.
(5) A mobile home park may not restrict a resident's right to advertise for
sale or sell his mobile home. However, the park may limit the size of a "for sale"
sign affixed to the mobile home to not more than 144 square inches.
(6) A mobile home park may not compel a resident who desires to sell his
mobile home, either directly or indirectly, to sell it through an agent designated
by the mobile home park.
(7) In order to upgrade the quality of a mobile home park, it may require
t h a t a mobile home be removed from the park upon sale if:
fa) the mobile home does not meet minimum size specifications; or
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(b) the mobile home is in rundown condition or in disrepair
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 4; 1989, ch.
110, § 1.

57-16-5. Grounds for terminating lease.
An agreement for the lease of mobile home space in a mobile home park may
be terminated during its term by mutual agreement or for any one or more of
the following causes:
(1) failure of a resident to comply with a mobile home park rule for a
period of 15 days after receipt of notice of noncompliance from the mobile
home park;
(2) repeated failure of a resident to abide by a mobile home park rule, if
the original notice of noncompliance states that another violation of the
same or a different rule might result in forfeiture without any further
period of cure;
(3) behavior by a resident which substantially endangers the security
and health of the other residents or threatens the property in the park;
(4) nonpayment of rent, fees, or service charges;
(5) a change in the land use or condemnation of the mobile home park
or any part of it.
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 5.

57-16-6. Action for lease termination — Prerequisite procedure.
A legal action to terminate a lease based upon a cause set forth in Section
57-16-5 may not be commenced except in accordance with the following
procedure:
(1) Before issuance of any summons and complaint, the mobile home
park shall send or serve written notice to the resident or subtenant:
(a) by delivering a copy of the notice personally;
(b) by sending a copy of the notice through registered or certified
mail addressed to the resident or subtenant at his place of residence;
(c) if the resident or subtenant is absent from his place of residence,
by leaving a copy of the notice with some person of suitable age and
discretion at his residence and sending a copy through the mail
addressed to the resident or subtenant at his place of residence; or
(d) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found, by
affixing a copy of the notice in a conspicuous place on the resident's or
subtenant's mobile home and also sending a copy through the mail
addressed to the resident or subtenant at his place of residence.
(2) The notice shall set forth the cause for the notice and, if the cause is
one which can be cured, the time within which the resident has to cure.
The notice shall also set forth the time after which the mobile home park
may commence legal action against the resident if cure is not effected, as
follows:
(a) In the event of failure to abide by a mobile home park rule, the
notice shall provide for a 15-day cure period except in the case of
repeated violations and, shall state that if a cure is not timely effected,
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or a written agreement made between the mobile home park and the
resident allowing for a variation in the rule or cure period, eviction
proceedings may be initiated immediately.
(b) If the resident commits repeated violations of a rule, a summons
and complaint may be issued three days after a notice is served.
(c) If a resident behaves in a manner that substantially endangers
the well-being or property of other residents, eviction proceedings
may commence immediately.
(d) If a resident does not pay rent, fees, or service charges, the
notice shall provide a three-day cure period and, that if cure is not
timely effected, or a written agreement made between the mobile
home park and the resident allowing for a variation in the rule or cure
period, eviction proceedings may be initiated immediately.
(e) If there is a planned change in land use or condemnation of the
park, the notice shall provide t h a t the resident has 90 days after
receipt of the notice to vacate the mobile home park if no governmental approval or permits incident to the planned change are required,
and if governmental approval and permits are required, t h a t the
resident has 90 days to vacate the mobile home park after all permits
or approvals incident to the planned change are obtained.
(3) If the planned change in land use or condemnation requires the
approval of a governmental agency, the mobile home park, in addition to
the notice required by Subsection (2)(e), shall send written notice of the
date set for the initial hearing to each resident at least seven days before
the date scheduled for the initial hearing.
(4) Regardless of whether the change of use requires the approval of
any governmental agency, if the resident was not a resident of the mobile
home park at the time the initial change of use notice was issued to
residents the owner shall give notice of the change of use to the resident
before he occupies the mobile home space.
(5) Eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter and based on
causes set forth in Subsections 57-16-5(1), (2), and (5) shall be brought in
accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall not be treated
as unlawful detainer actions under Title 78, Chapter 36. Eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter and based on causes of action set forth
in Subsections 57-16-5(3) and (4) may, at the election of the mobile home
park, be treated as actions brought under this chapter and the unlawful
detainer provisions of Title 78, Chapter 36, except, if unlawful detainer is
charged, the court shall endorse on the summons the number of days
within which the defendant is required to appear and defend the action,
which shall not be less than five days or more than 20 days from the date
of service.
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 6; 1987, ch. 92,
§ 81; 1989, ch. 110, § 2.

57-16-7.

R u l e s of parks.

(1) A mobile home park may promulgate rules related to the health, safety,
and appropriate conduct of residents and to the maintenance and upkeep of
such park. No change in rule that is unconscionable is valid. No new or
amended rule shall take effect, nor provide the basis for an eviction notice,
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until the expiration of at least 60 days after its promulgation. Each resident,
as a condition precedent to such rule being in effect, shall be provided with a
copy of each new or amended rule that does not appear in their lease
agreement.
(2) A mobile home park may specify the type of material used, and the
methods used in the installation of, underskirting, awnings, porches, fences, or
other additions or alterations to the exterior of a mobile home, and may also
specify the tie-down equipment used in a mobile home space, in order to insure
the safety and good appearance of the park; but under no circumstances may
it require a resident to purchase such material or equipment from a supplier
designated by the mobile home park.
(3) No mobile home park may charge an entrance fee, exit fee, nor installation fee, but reasonable landscaping and maintenance requirements may be
included in the mobile home park rules. The resident is responsible for all costs
incident to connection of the mobile home to existing mobile home park
facilities and for the installation and maintenance of the mobile home on the
mobile home space.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a mobile home park
from requiring a reasonable initial security deposit.
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 7.

57-16-8. Payment of rent and fees during pendency of
eviction proceeding.
If a resident elects to contest an eviction proceeding, all rents, fees, and
service charges due and incurred during the pendency of the action shall be
paid into court according to the current mobile home park payment schedule.
Failure of the resident to pay such amounts may, in the discretion of the court,
constitute grounds for granting summary judgment in favor of the mobile
home park. Upon final termination of the issues between the parties, the court
shall order all amounts paid into court paid to the mobile home park. The
prevailing party is also entitled to court costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 8.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in
Utah, 1984 Utah L Rev 553

57-16-9. Lienholder's liability for rent and fees.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 38-3-2 and Section 70A-9-317, the
lienholder of record of a mobile home is primarily liable to the mobile home
park owner or operator for rent and service charges if a mobile home is not
removed within 10 days after receipt of written notice that a mobile home has
been abandoned or that a writ of restitution has been issued The lienholder,
however, is only liable for rent that accrues after receipt of such notice.
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 9.
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57-16-10. Utility service to mobile home p a r k s — Limitation on providers' charges.
Local water, sewer, and sanitation entities, including those administered by
municipalities and counties which provide water, sewer, or garbage collection
services shall not receive a greater percentage net return from supplying a
mobile home park than said entity receives from other residential customers.
The net return is determined by taking into consideration the costs of
maintenance and depreciation of the mobile home park facilities and all
savings on administrative costs, including cost of billing residents.
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 10.

57-16-11. Rights and remedies not exclusive.
The rights and remedies granted by this chapter are cumulative and not
exclusive.
History: L. 1981, ch 178, 5 11.

57-16-12. Waiver of rights a n d duties prohibited.
No park or resident may agree to waive any right, duty, or privilege
conferred by this chapter.
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 12.

57-16-15.1. Eviction proceeding.
(1) Eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter and based on causes
of action set forth in Subsections 57-16-5(1), (2), and (5), and eviction
proceedings commenced under this chapter based on causes of action set forth
in Subsections 57-16-5(3) and (4), where a landlord elects to bring an action
under this chapter and not under the unlawful detainer provisions of Title 78,
Chapter 36, shall provide for the following:
la) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A
judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff may include an order of
restitution of the premises. The judgment may also declare the forfeiture
of the lease or agreement.
(b) The jury or the court, if the proceedings are tried without a j u r y or
upon the defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to
the plaintiff from any of the following:
(i) waste of the premises during the resident's tenancy, if waste is
alleged in the complaint and proved; and
(ii) the amount of rent due.
(c) The judgment shall also provide for reasonable attorneys' fees, if
they are provided for in the lease or agreement.
(d) If the proceeding is contested, the prevailing party is entitled to
court costs and attorneys' fees, regardless of whether the lease agreement
provides for the same.
(e) In all cases, after judgment has been entered, judgment and restitution may be enforced immediately, except, however, if a resident tenders
408

RESIDENTIAL RENTERS' DEPOSITS

57-17-1

to the mobile home park postjudgment rent, in the form of cash, cashier's
check, or certified funds, then restitution may be delayed for the period of
time covered by the postjudgment rent, which time period shall not exceed
15 days from the date of the judgment unless a longer period is agreed to
in writing by the mobile home park.
(2) Eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter and based on causes
of action set forth in Subsections 57-16-5(3) and (4), in which the mobile home
park has elected to treat as actions also brought under the unlawful detainer
provisions of Title 78, Chapter 36, shall be governed by Section 78-36-10 with
respect to judgment for restitution, damages, rent, enforcement of the judgment and restitution.
History: C. 1953,57-16-15.1, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 110, § 3.

CHAPTER 17
RESIDENTIAL RENTERS' DEPOSITS
Section
57-17-1.
57-17-2.
57-17-3.

Section
57-17-4.

Return
or
explanation
of
retainage upon termination of
tenancy.
Non-refundable deposit — Written notice required.
Deductions from deposit — Written itemization — Time for return.

57-17-5.

Holder of owner's or designated
agent's interest bound by provisions.
Failure to give renter required notice — Recovery of deposit, penalty and costs.

57-17-L Return or explanation of retainage upon termination of tenancy.
Owners or designated agents requiring deposits however denominated from
renters leasing or renting residential dwelling units shall either return those
deposits at the termination of the tenancy or provide the renter with written
notice explaining why any deposit refundable under the terms of the lease or
rental agreement is being retained.
History: L. 1981, ch. 74, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review.
Landlord-Tenant
Law: A Perspective on Reform in Utah, 1981
Utah L. Rev. 727, 751.
Brigham Young Law Review. — Necessity
or Overkill? Regulating Residential LandlordTenant Relations through the Utah Consumer
Sales Practices Act, 1990 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1063.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and
Tenant §§ 651 to 657.

C.J.S.
52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant
§§ 472(1) to 476.
A.L.R. — Landlord-tenant security deposit
legislation, 63 A.L.R.4th 901.
What constitutes abandonment of residential
or commercial lease — modern cases, 84
A.L.R.4th 183.
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were fired. The recoid shows that in this ments due under uniform real estate condemonstration the j m v weie told that a tract which provided that purchasers
table in the courtroom represented the hor- should pay S55 a month and which proizontal position of the body at the titn^ vided that vendor's acceptance of paythe shot was fired.
Demonstrations
oi ments for less than according to terms of
physical facts are often made by attorneys contiact, should in no way alter teims of
in aigumcnts to juries. There was evi- contract as to forfeiture, was not a waiver
dence introduced at the trial as to the by vendor of strict performance of the
course the bullets took. The jury could contract. 1
not have been misled by the demonstration.
We are of the opinion that appellant was 2. Vendor and purchaser C='299(2)
Acceptance by vendor of purchasers'
not prejudiced by the district attorney's
past
due payment under uniform real esacts in that regard.
tate contract, and vendor's other conduct
[6] Appellant next contends that the towards purchasers, leading purchasers to
court erred in refusing to grant a new trial. belie\e that strict performance would not
He argues that the evidence is clear that be required by vendor, imposed on vendor
appellant acted in self-defense and that duty of giving to purchasers a reasonable
therefore the verdict is contrary to the law notice before vendor could insist on strict
and the evidence adduced at the trial. If performance by purchasers.
the only evidence in the case was that produced by appellant this argument might 3. Vendor and purchaser <S=>299(2)
have some weight. However, as we pointVendor's notice to purchasers that real
ed out in our first opinion in this case, estate contract between them for the purthere was sufficient evidence from which a chase of certain house was in default bejury might reasonably find the appellant cause of non-payment of principal and inguilty of murder in the first degree. The terest in amount of $557.50 and that unless
court therefore did not err in refusing to full amount of such payments and interest
grant a new trial.
in default was paid to attorney for vendor
within seven days vendor elected to declare
Affirmed.
contract forfeited in accordance with
MCDONOUGH, C. J., and PRATT and terms thereof, was reasonable notice to
LATIMER, JJ., concur.
purchasers that vendor was no longer waiving strict performance of the contract and
WOLFE, J., concurs in the result.
would insist on its right to forfeit.
4. Appeal and error <&^B4I

PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT CO. v. STEWART et ux.
No. 7082.

Supreme Court of Utah.
July 2, 1948.

Where facts in unlawful detainer action surrounding attempted forfeiture of
uniform real estate contract by vendor, because of defaults by purchasers, were undisputed, the Supreme Court on appeal
might determine, as a matter of law, what
was a reasonable time of vendor's notice
to purchasers of intent to forfeit contract.
Utah Code 1943, 104—30—3.
5. Vendor and purchaser C=^299(2)

Fact that vendor did not insist on
prompt payments by purchasers of install-

Vendor's notice of 23 days to purchasers of intention to forfeit uniform real
estate contract because of purchasers' default in payment of $557.50 of principal
and interest, was reasonable time.

1 Leone v. Zunfca, 84 Utah 417, 34 P.
2d G99, 94 A.L.K. 1232; Christy et ux.

v. Guild et ux., 101 Utah 313, 121 P.2d
401.

I. Vendor and purchaser <§=>I87

P A C I F I C D E V E L O P M E N T TO. v. S T E W A R T
Cite as 195 P.2d 748

Appeal from District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Utah County; Joseph E.
Nelson, Judge.
Unlawful detainer action by the Pacific
Development Company against J. B. Stewart and Corilla Stewart, his wife. From
an adverse judgment, the plaintiff appeals.
Judgment reversed and case remanded
for findings and decree in accordance with
opinion.
Clair M. Aldrich, of Provo, for appellant.
L E. Brockbank, of Provo, for respondents.
PRATT, Justice.
This action was commenced under Section 104—60—3, U.C.A.1943, our unlawful
detainer statute. Many of the facts were
stipulated.
Pacific Development Company, plaintiff
and appellant, sold to J. P. Stewart and
Corilla Stewart, his wife, a house and lot
in Provo, Utah, for the sum of $5900.00.
The agreement of sale and purchase was
the typical "Uniform Real Estate Contract". Purchasers agreed to pay amounts
totaling $100.00 before entering into possession and $55.00 a month each month
thereafter, the first payment to be October
1, 1944. The O.P.A. rental ceiling of $50.00 per month was testified to as the reasonable rental value of the property.
From the outset the purchasers did not
make their payments in accordance with
the contract. Sometimes they paid less
than the installment required. They did
not pay on the 1st day of the month, but on
various days. In November, 1944, payment
was not made until the 29th. No payment
of any amount was made in December of
1944. During 1945 the purchasers failed
to pay any amount in the months of August, November or December. This conduct was continued until October 24, 1946,
at which time the purchasers were in arrears $557.50—their last payment was October 14, 1946. From time to time between
October, 1944 and October, 1946, the seller demanded that the contract be paid up
to date and from time to time the buyers
were assured that no forfeiture of their
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rights was at that time contemplated, but
that they should, "do the best you can" or
they should catch it up as fast as they
could.
Finally on October 24, 1946, the seller
mailed the following notice to the purchasers:
"You are hereby notified that the real
estate contract by and between the Pacific
Development Company as seller and yourselves as purchasers, for the purchase of
the house and lot located at 1069 East 5th
South, Provo, is now in default on your
part by reason of non-payment of principal
and interest in the amount of Five Hundred Fifty Seven Dollars and Fifty Cents
($557.50), and that unless the full amount
of said payments and interest in default
are paid to the undersigned attorney for
the seller within seven days (7) from date
the seller elects to declare said contract
forfeited in accordance with the terms
thereof.
"Dated 24th day of October, 1946."
Immediately after the quoted notice was
received the buyers began negotiations
with the seller. It was their purpose to
get further time in which to bring their
payments up to date. The seller objected
to any payments except the full amount
due on the contract—$557.50. (The amount
appears as $562.50 at one place in the testimony.) However, the way was left open
for further negotiation up until November
11, 1946, Armistice Day, due to Mr. Stewart's work. On November 12, 1946, a notice to quit in accordance with 104—60—3,
U.C.A.1943, was served upon the buyers
giving them five days in which to bring
their contract up to date or return possession to the seller. On November 19, 1946,
the complaint in this action was filed. The
lower court rendered a "Decree" of no
cause of action which, of course, denied the
plaintiff a writ of possession.
Plaintiff
has appealed.
The facts related above are undisputed.
The plaintiff, as we understand its actions,
is here attempting to declare a forfeiture
of the defendants' interest in the property
not because the defendants have failed to
pay any particular payment at the time it
was due but because of their failure to
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b r i n g (.lie loin; overdue
d a t e a f t e r notice.

payments

up

to

U n o of the provisions of the c o n t r a c t aff e c . i n g forfeiture is as follows:
" I t is understood and
seller accepts payments
this c o n t r a c t less than
t e r m s herein mentioned
it will in no way alter
c o n t r a c t as to forfeiture
lated;'

a g r e e d that if the
from the buyer on
a c c o r d i n g to the
then by so doing,
the t e r m s of the
h e r e i n a f t e r stipu-

A c t u a l forfeiture w a s p r o v i d e d
t h e following l a n g u a g e :

for

in

" I n the event of a failure to comply with
the t e r m s hereof by the B u y e r , o r upon
failure to make any p a y m e n t s when the
s a m e shall become due, or within 20 days
t h e r e a f t e r , the Seller shall, at his
option,
be released from all obligations in law a n d
e q u i t y to convey said property and all paym e n t s which have been m a d e t h e r e t o f o r e
on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited, to the Seller as liquidated d a m a g e s
for the n o n - p e r f o r m a n c e o^ the c o n t r a c t
a n d the Buyer agrees t h a t ; t h e Seller may,
a t his option re-enter and take possession
of said premises without, legal p r o c e s s as
in its first and former estate, t o g e t h e r with
all i m p r o v e m e n t s and a d d i t i o n s m a d e by
t h e B u y e r thereon, and the said a d d i t i o n s
a n d i m p r o v e m e n t s shall r e m a i n w i t h the
land, and become the p r o p e r t y of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at o n c e a t e n a n t at
will of the Seller. It is a g r e e d t h a t time
is t h e essence of this a g r e e m e n t . "
(Italics
added.)
[ 1 ] T h e lower c o u r t concluded t h a t
plaintiff had waived the strict p e r f o r m a n c e
of the contract. H o w e v e r , that w a i v e r of
t h e seller's right to insist on p r o m p t paym e n t s did not destroy its r i g h t to forfeit
d e f e n d a n t s ' interest when they continually
failed to p e r f o r m (see first q u o t a t i o n
above).
Christy ct ux. v. Guild ct ux.,
101 U t a h 313, 121 R 2 d 401. T h o u g h sell e r ' s conduct may have led the b u y e r s to
believe that the seller would not insist on
p r o m p t payments being m a d e , n o t h i n g
a b o u t its actions should h a v e led t h e m to
believe that the seller h a d p e r m a n e n t l y
w a i v e d its right to declare a f o r f e i t u r e of
w h a t e v e r interest buyers h a d in the cont r a c t . N o t h i n g in the t e r m s of t h e con-

tract, or the acts of the p a r t i e s indicate an
intention to penalize the seller for leniency.
T h e quoted provisions of the contract contemplated a notice from seller to buyer
that seller intended to e x e r c i s e its optirn
of forfeiture.
Leone v. Z u n i g a , 84 Utah
417, 34 i\2d 699, 94 A . L . R . 1232. Such
notice was not given immediately upon any
of the defaults first o c c u r r i n g ; but that did
not mean that seller w a s g o i n g to continue
such conduct forever.
[2] T h e r e is no question that the acceptance by the seller of b u y e r s ' past due
p a y m e n t s and its o t h e r c o n d u c t t o w a r d the
buyers leading the l a t t e r to believe that
strict p e r f o r m a n c e would not be required
by the seller, imposes upon the seller the
duty of giving to the b u y e r a reasonable
notice before it m a y insist on strict performance by the b u y e r s .
In B r o w n v.
Chowchilla L a n d Co., 59 Cal.App. 164,
210 P. 424, at page 427, the c o u r t s t a t e d :
" T h e r e q u i r e m e n t of notice after the
receipt of o v e r d u e p a y m e n t s without objection is based upon the equitable conside r a t i o n that by his c o n d u c t the vendor has
led the vendee into t h e belief that the
f o r m e r will c o n t i n u e to w a i v e the strict
p e r f o r m a n c e of t h e c o n t r a c t . "
(Italics
curs.)
[ 3 ] T h e lower c o u r t concluded that the
notice and d e m a n d t h a t t h e plaintiff gave
defendants were not reasonable.
With
that conclusion w e c a n n o t a g r e e . T h e notice (quoted a b o v e ) i n f o r m e d the defenda n t s t h a t the plaintiff i n t e n d e d , after many
lenities, to insist upon its forfeiture rights
u n d e r t h e c o n t r a c t at least as to past due
payments.
T h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s understood plaintiff's i n t e n t i o n s is shown by
their a c t i o n s — t h e y i m m e d i a t e l y began negotiations for f u r t h e r t i m e in which to
b r i n g their p a y m e n t s u p to d a t e . W a s the
time allowed t h e m t o accomplish this, a
reasonable length of t i m e ?
T h e letter of O c t o b e r 24, 1946, demanded
p a y m e n t within 7 d a y s . M r s . S t e w a r t in
response t h e r e t o s t a r t e d negotiations to
get further time, r e q u e s t i n g until January
1, 1947, to m a k e up p a s t due payments.
T h a t request w a s refused, but further negotiations w e r e a n t i c i p a t e d and a consultation with M r . S t e w a r t w a s requested by
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the plaintiff for November 11, 1946 Defendants ignored that request
On November 12, 1946 the notice to quit was
served on the defendants. By that notice
the defendants were given an additional 5
days in which to pay their past due obi gations under the contract They were unable to do so. As a matter of fact, the defendants were unable to make the payments which were past due at any time
prior to the commencement of the action.
There is seme suggestion in the record that
at the time of trial (February 3, 1947) a
sale was available, and they cou1d p ly up.
They had been trying to sell the propeity
presumably to get out of the deal, whole.
Although the notice mailed on October
24th gdve defendants only 7 days in which
to pay there were 23 days (October 25,
1946—November 17, 1946) actually allowed
them
The contract itself provided a 20 day
grace period for the payment of installments, before forfeiture might be enforced.
(See second quotation from contract)
The t i mc actually allowed after the notice of October 24, 1946, was 23 days.
Of course, one must recognize that it
is much harder to raise $557 SO than it
would be to raise one installment of $55 00.
There is rocm for argument that the mention of 20 days in the contract is not necessarily a good measure of a reasonable
time where the sum in default has become
quite large That 20 days, however, is not
limited to just an installment pa>ment, but
applies to other delinquencies Be that as
it ma\, the seller in this case has made repeated efforts to induce the buyers to comply With their contract
The first letter
is dated as early as Apnl 25, 1945, calling
their attention to the date installments
were due, with which buyers had not complied Letters subsequent to that were dated in December 1945, and in January and
March of 1946, then followed the ones re-

ferred to picviously in the body of the
opinion
Repeated warnings without their strict
enforcement arc, ot course, indicative of a
willingness to waive that strict performance, but they also have probative value
ot a cautionary nature They should wain
the buyers the seller cannot continue such
conduct indefinitely
Under such circumstances the buyers should not let themselves into a position whereby they are
forced to assume they can rely on the seller agreeing With them as to whit would
be a reasonable lengdi of time to make up
delinquencies
Under the cncumstances of this case,
we believe that the buyers, the defendants,
wcie given a reasonable length of time
to clear themselves of default
There is
grave doubt that they would ha\e been
able to accomplish that goal even with a
longer tunc They had not paid the equivalent of the rental value of the property
for the time they occupied it.
[4,5] Where the facts surrounding the
transaction are uiulisj utul, as they are in
this case, this court may deteimme, as a
matter of law, what is a lciscnable tune.
First National Dai k v 'Pipe & Contraetors
Supply Co , 2 O r , 271 F 105 at pages 107,
10S We hold that 23 days was a reasonable time to ail)w defendants to make up
the oveulue payments under the circumstances of this case. A writ of possession
should have issued in accordance with Section 104—60—3, U C A 1943.
I h e judgment of the lower court is re\erbcd and the ea^e is reminded for finduigb and decree in accordance with this
opinion Costs to appellant.
W \DC, W O L F E , and LATIMER, JJ.,
concur
McDONOUGH, C. J., concurs in the result.
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til a notice of intention to forfeit unless all sale of realty were unpaid at the tuno venarrearages shall be paid before a certain dors served notice on purchasers that condate has been served on the defaulting buy- tract would he terminated and purchasers'
er and has not been complied with. Such lights thereunder forfeited unless such payis not the contract nor is it the rule or prac- ments were made and other terms of contice. The trial court committed no error in tract complied with within 12 days, and that
no attempt to make such payments was made
overruling the general demurrer.
until after notice to vacate had been served
[6] There are two other assignments on purchasers subsequent to termination of
mentioned in the brief but not argued there- the contract by vendors, there was no quesin. One is that no notice of forfeiture was tion for the jury as to whether there had
served upon Ethel Sorenson, wife of O. G. been a default in the performance of teims
Sorenson, the purchaser. There is no merit of contract.
to this assignment. It is disposed of by
the decision of this court in McNeil v. Mc- 2. Vendor and purchaser C=>95(3)
Neil, 61 Utah 141, 211 P. 988.
Where contract for sale of realty specifComplaint is made as to Finding of Fact ically provided that the acceptance by venNumber Twelve. It is conceded by re- dors of payments thereunder other than acspondent that such finding is outside the is- cording to terms of contract would in no way
sues and the record, and should not have alter terms thereof as to forfeiture, the acbeen made by the court. However, super- ceptance by vendors, after giving purchasers
fluous finding does not affect the merits of notice of intention to enforce forfeiture prothe judgment in general. Finding of Fact visions of contract if payments were not
Number Twelve, Conclusion of Law *C\ made on time, of payment past due at the
and the next to the last paragraph of the time such notice was given, did not "waive"
decree are beyond the issues and evidence contract provision as to time being of the essence thereof, nor preclude vendors from
and should be stricken.
[7] The Bank argues that the judgment terminating contract in accordance with
should be amended to provide for recovery terms thereof for purchasers' noncompliance
of the 1939 rental. No cross-assignments therewith.i
See Words and Phrases, Permanent
are made and no cross-appeal taken, so that
Edition, for all other definitions of
matter is not before us.
"Waive".
The cause is remanded to the District
Court with directions to correct the findings 3. Vendor and purchaser <S^298
of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment
In vendors' unlawful detainer action for
as indicated. As so amended the judgment restitution of realty in the possession of puris affirmed.
chasers under a contract of sale, where purRespondent to recover costs.
chasers failed td make past-due payments in
MOFFAT, C J., and W O L F E , Mc- compliance with notice served on them by
vendors of intention to terminate contract
DONOUGH, and P R A T T , JJ., concur.
in accordance with provisions thereof unless
payments were made and other provisions
of contract complied with in 12 days, and
notice to quit was accordingly served on purchasers, vendors weie entitled to a directed
verdict determining that they had the right
to possession of the realty, regardless of
whether other provisions of the contract
CHRISTY et ux. v. GUILD et ux.
were in default. Kev.St.1033, 101-60-3.
No. 6320.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 22, 1042.
I. Vendor and purchaser <3=>298
Where it was admitted that several
monthly payments due under contract for
1 Fausett v. General Electric Contracts
Corporation, Utah, 112 P.2d 140.
121 P.2d—26

4. Damages 0 8 0 ( 3 )
In an equitable action, court will take
into consideration what has been paid upon
a contract for the sale of real property in determining whether a forfeiture provision of
the contract will be enforced by it.2
2 Croft v. Jensen, M> Utah 13, 10 P 2d
10S; Dunbar v. Hansen, GS Utah 3DS,
250 P. 0S2.
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5. Vendor and purchaser C=>298
In Ttah it is thp < oniuion pi.icheo, \\ iioro
ronlty is in Hie {xj^os^ion of put chamois
who .no in default uudor contiaet of sal<\
to bring an unlawful detainer action against
such purehaseis. Kev.St.1933, 104 00-3.3
6. Damages @=>80(3)

Where contract for sale of realty provided for no down payment and the net monthly income from the lealty was sufficient to
more than compensate for payments made
under contract and improvements placed on
premises by purchasers, contract provision,
authorizing vendors to terminate contract
for default in payment and retain as liquidated damages all payments theretofore
made, was not imalid as providing for a
"penalty" so as to preclude vendors, who
had tciinitiated contract in accordance with
such provision and sened puichasers with
notice to quit, from maintaining unlawful
detainer action for restitution of the realty.
Ilev.SU933, 104-00-3.4
See Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, for all other definitions of
"Penalty".
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contract, entered into in 1035, the Guilds
were to pay $3,200 for the property in
monthly installments of $30, including both
principal and interest. They further agreed
to make certain improvements on the front
and rear of the house located on the property and to pay all taxes and assessments
and keep the property insured against fire.

On April 30, 1940, respondents served appellants with notice that in accordance with
the terms thereof, the contract would be
terminated for failure (1) to make monthly installments totalling $130, (2) to make
the improvements provided for, and (3)
to pay the taxes and insurance in the
amount of $297.20, unless said payments,
with interest, and said improvements were
made before May 12, 1940. The notice concluded: "Unless you [comply by May 12]
you shall, in accordance with the provisions
of said contract, and by the election of said
Sellers, forfeit as liquidated damages all
pa\ merits heretofore made by you on said
contract and will become a tenant at will
of the said John Christy and Kathryn E.
Christy of the real property". Nothing was
done to comply with the conditions of the
notice; and on the 15th of May, 1940, a
Appeal from District Court, Third Dis- notice to quit was served on appellants.
trict, Salt Lake County; Oscar W. McUpon failure of the Guilds to vacate, this
Conkie, Judge.
action was commenced. The complaint, in
Unlawful detainer action by John Chris- addition to setting out the above facts, furty and Kathryn E. Christy, husband and ther alleged: "That the plaintiffs are entiwife, against Edward L. Guild and Ma- tled to the immediate possession of said
bel C. Guild, husband and wife, for res- premises. That the defendants have failed,
titution of certain realty in the posses- refused and neglected to surrender said
sion of defendants under a contract of premises and still continue in possession
sale and for treble damages for the un- thereof and still refuse to surrender the
lawful detention of the realty. From a same to the plaintiffs. That the monthly
judgment in favor of plaintiffs, entered up- value of the rents and profits of said premises is the reasonable sum of $75.00." Then
on a directed verdict, defendants appeal.
followed a prayer for restitution of the
Judgment affirmed.
premises and for treble damages for the
J. D. Skeen and E. J. Skeen, both of Salt unlawful detention.
Lake City, for appellants,
Appellants answered, admitting the alleH. L. Mulliner and H. G. Metos, both of gations of the complaint as to the existSalt Lake City, for respondents.
ence and terms of the contract of sale.
As to the asserted defaults in the performMCDONOUGH, justice.
ance of the contract, however, it was alThis is an unlawful detainer action, orig- leged (1) that the provisions with respect
inally commenced in the City Court of Salt to improvements were waived; (2) that a
Lake City, for the restitution of certain note had been given for the payment of
premises in the possession of Edward L. taxes and insurance upon which note payGuild and Mabel C. Guild, his wife, under ments had been made; and (3) that paya contract of sale, from John Christy and ments on the contract had been made to
Kathryn E. Christy, his wife. Under the and including March 31, 1940, and that "be3 Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292
P. 20(3.

4Dopp v. Richards, 43 Utah 332, 135
P. 98.

CHRISTY v. C.UILD

Utah

403

121 P.2d 401

fore the institution of this suit they [defendants] tendered to the said plaintiffs
the total amount due upon said contract,
exclusive of the said note, to-wit: the sum
of $130."
The answer further set out that appellants had made improvements on said property of the approximate cost and value of
$2,000; that they had made 49 payments
upon the contract of sale from March 16,
1935, to March 31, 1940, "in various
amounts aggregating a total of $1,647.67."
The other allegations of the complaint were
denied, except defendants admitted "that
they refused to surrender the premises to
the plaintiffs and allege that they have a
legal right to retain possession of the same."
The case was first tried in the city court
and then appealed to the district court,
where it was tried before a jury. At the
conclusion of the evidence the court, on
motion, directed a verdict for respondents,
granting restitution of the premises and
assessing damages in the sum of $137.50,
which sum, in accordance with the prayer
of the complaint, was trebled.
This appeal presents two problems for
our consideration: (1) Whether in view
of the evidence the issues as to the alleged
defaults of appellants should have been
submitted to the j u r y ; and (2) whether at
all events the trial court should have considered the "equities" between the parties
and adjudged that appellants were entitled
to some reimbursement for the improvements made and for the large amount paid
on the contract (approximately one-third
of the principal sum, plus interest).
[1] We conclude, from a review of the
record, that the lower court did not err in
refusing to submit to the jury the question
of whether there had been a default in the
performance of the terms of the contract.
As to the delinquency in making payments
on the contract amounting to $130, it has
never been urged that such default did not
exist. Nor was any attempt made to make
up such delinquency until after the notice
to vacate had been served on appellants
subsequent to the termination of the contract by respondents. It is argued, however,
that there had been a waiver of the term
of the contract as to time being of the essence thereof and that reasonable notice
was not given of respondent's intention to
enforce the contract in this respect for failure to make the payments as stipulated.
Payments were not made strictly in accordance with the terms of the contract from

the very beginning. But commencing with
January, 1940, the appellants were given
notice of intention to enforce the forfeiture
provisions of the contract if payments were
not made in time, and appellants promised
to make the required payments. Notwithstanding, on April 30, 1940, appellants were
in arrears on monthly installments for part
of December, 1939, and for all of January,
February, March, and April, 1940. Appellants point to the fact that a payment was
made on the contract on March 31, 1940,
as an indication of waiver of defaults in
making the monthly installments.
This
payment, applied on past due installments,
brought the payments up to and including
part of December, 1939.
[2] We are of the opinion that under
the state of facts here presented, the acceptance of the payment of March 31, 1940,
on past due installments did not for several
reasons result in a waiver. In the first
place the contract of the parties specifically
provided that the acceptance by the vendors from the vendees of payments thereunder other than according to the terms of
the contract would in no way alter the terms
thereof as to forfeiture. Discussing a similar provision in a contract for the sale of
realty the California District Court of Appeals in Brown v. Chowchilla Land Co., 59
Cal.App. 164, 210 P. 424, 427, hearing denied by Supreme C6urt, stated:
"If the parties had expressly provided
that the acceptance by the vendor of payments after they were due should not be
deemed a waiver of : the provision that time
is of the essence of the contract and should
not be considered a relinquishment of the
vendor's right to claim a forfeiture for
any subsequent default on the part of the
vendee, then it would not be illegal or inequitable for the vendor to insist upon forfeiture for any such subsequent default.
The requirement of notice after the receipt of overdue payments without objection is based upon the equitable consideration that by his conduct the vendor has
led the vendee into the belief that the former will continue to waive the strict performance of the contract. The principle
of equitable estoppel is involved. But the
reason for the rule does not exist where
the parties have expressly agreed that such
waiver shall not affect any subsequent
breach or relinquish the right of the vendor to insist thereafter upon a strict observance of the terms of the contract. We
think the parties could not have more ef-
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fectually provided that a waiver of a bicach
of the contract should not be held to have
occurred by reason of the forbearance of
the vendor to take advantage of any prior
default.
"The parties could not fail to understand
from the particular covenant in question
that the acceptance of any overdue payment or payments was to be regarded as an
indulgence to the vendee, but as to the future the whole contract remained in full
force and effect and rendered the vendee
subject to the penalty of forfeiture for any
default thereafter. We may repeat that
the right to declare a forfeiture for the
failure to pay on time is one of the covenants of the contract and hence it is a part
of the agreement which the parties have in
effect declared shall not be deemed waived
or affected by any previous default. The
case therefore stands as though there had
been no belated acceptance of payments,
and since there were several installments
long overdue at the time the action was
brought, plaintiff was clearly in default,
and the right of forfeiture, existed in behalf of defendant, no affirmative action
being required on his part to work a cancelation."

Sec, also, .is to default in making a
monthly pa>ment, Fau^ett v. General Electric Contracts Corp, Utah, 112 P 2d 149.
See Cassiday v. Adamson, 208 Iowa 417,
224 N.W. 508.
[3] As we view the evidence, there was
nothing to submit to the jury on the issue
of default. There was a clear breach of
the contract in regard to the monthly installments due under the contract. We,
therefore, need not consider the effect of
the failure to make the improvements provided for by the contract, nor do we need
to determine the legal significance of the
taking of a promissory note for the delinquent taxes and insurance which appellants
urge constituted a pa>ment of these items.
What we do determine is that appellants
defaulted in the performance of the terms
of the contract, as a result of which after
giving appellants an opportunity to perform, respondents, in accordance with the
specific terms thereof, terminated the same
and declared appellants to be tenants at
will; that in view of the evidence the trial
court properly directed a verdict in favor
of respondents determining that they had
the right to possession of the premises involved.

Secondly, after the notice to pay up was
[4] The second problem involves a degiven in January, the payment made was
on delinquencies existing prior thereto. termination of whether in an unlawful de"The acceptance of a past due installment tainer action brought pursuant to the proor installments does not affect the notice, visions of Section 104-60-3, R.S.U.1933, the
previously given, that in the future strict defendant may raise and the trial court conperformance will be required." 66 C.J. 483, sider the "equities" which may exist beSec. 383. Of a like state of facts, the court tween the parties. It is clear that this acin Watkins v. Warren, 122 Cal.App. 617, tion is strictly one in unlawful detainer.
10 P.2d 500, 502, said: "But there is no It was so treated by the parties and by the
merit to appellants' contention that, by the court, the latter trebling the damages found,
acceptance after October 10, 1928, of fur- as provided for in such actions. Appellants,
ther installments on these past-due pay- however, contend that since a forfeiture
ments, respondents waived the demand of of a contract of sale of real property is inOctober 10, 1928, restoring the time is of volved in this case, and since there has been
the essence clause. This notice is in no a considerable amount paid on the contract
way affected by acceptance of past-due pay- by appellants, in addition to the making of
ments which were past due at the time the improvements of the alleged value of $2,notice was given, nor is it retroactive. The 000, the court should consider this as one
notice is intended to affect and can affect element in determining whether respondonly such pa>ments as may become due ents are entitled to possession of the premafter the date of the notice. If plaintiffs ises or were entitled to terminate the conhave accepted any past-due payment which tract. To support this contention cases are
became due after October 10, 1928, they cited to the effect that the court in an eqhave again waived the time is of the es- uitable action will take into consideration
sence clause. The only payments set out what has been paid upon a contract for the
in appellants' amendment to the answer by sale of real property in determining whethwhich they claim a waiver are these which er a forfeiture provision of the contract
were due and in default before the date will be enforced by it. See Croft v. Jenof plaintiffs' notice. The authorities cited, sen, S6 Utah 13, 40 P.2d 198. On the other
hand, we are confronted with the contensupra, are clear on this point."
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tion by respondents that in a summary
action such as this for an unlawful detainer the only issue presented to the court is
the right to possession where the relationship of landlord and tenant exists and that
no equitable defense may be interposed or
considered. Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137,
292 P. 206; Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah
398, 250 P. 982; Yukon Inv. Co. v. Crescent Meat Co., 140 Wash. 136, 248 P. 377;
Aegerter v. Hayes, 55 S.D. 337, 226 N.W.
345; Grylls v. Hergiton, 268 Mich. 35, 255
N.W. 334; William Weisman Realty Co.
v. Cohen, 157 Minn. 161, 195 N.W. 898.
Contra, Schubert v. Lowe, 193 Cal. 291,
223 P. 550.
No question has been raised in this case
as to the right to bring an action for unlawful detainer by a vendor against a defaulting vendee. The cases are not in harmony as to whether such may be done. See
Putnam v. McClain, 198 Iowa 287, 199 N.
W. 261; Cassiday v. Adamson, 208 Iowa
417, 224 N.W. 508; Music v. De Long, 209
Iowa 1068, 229 N.W. 673; Clark v. Dye,
158 Minn. 217, 197 N.W. 209; Stevens v.
McDowell, 151 Kan. 316, 98 P.2d 410;
Schroeder v. Woody, Or., 109 P.2d 597.
[5] In those jurisdictions where in such
a case an action for unlawful detainer lies,
the practice under appropriate fact situations is to bring a suit in equity to enjoin
the detainer action and determine the equities between the parties. See, Stubbs v.
Austin, 285 Ill.App. 535, 2 N . E 2 d 358; William Weisman Holding Co. v. Miller, 152
Minn. 330, 188 N . w / 7 3 2 ; Security Inv.
Co. v. Meister, 214 Mich. 337, 183 N.W.
183. In this jurisdiction, it appears to be
the common practice, under such a contract
as is here involved, to bring an unlawful
detainer action against a defaulting vendee.
See, Forrester v. Cook, supra.
In the present action, respondents in their
complaint set out the contract, which provided that upon default of the vendees the
vendors might elect to terminate the contract and upon such termination might re-
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tain as liquidated damages the pa>ments
theretofore made by the vendees; the latter thereupon becoming tenants at will of
the former. Appellants contend, however,
that the provision relative to liquidated damages is in fact a penalty provision and hence
void.
[6] Assuming that such an issue may
properly be raised in an action such as thib,
we must conclude that the forfeiture provision of the contract is just what it purports to be and not a penalty. The contract
provided for no down payment.
The
monthly installments to be made were $20
for the first six months; $25 00 per month
the next six months; and $30 per month
from then on until the entire sum had been
paid. While appellants offered to prove
that $2,000 worth of improvements had been
made on the premises, such proof would
not aid their cause since it was admitted
that the net monthly income from the premises was $75. Such a monthly income would
more than compensate for the improvements made, plus the monthly installments.
In view of the use value of the premises
as compared to the monthly installment
to be made, including improvements also
made, we cannot say that the forfeiture
provision was such that the trial court
should have held it to be a penalty and refused to permit respondents to maintain
an action based on the invoking of such
provision of the contract. Dopp v. Richards, 43 Utah 332, 135 P. 98.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to respondents.
W O L F E , LARSON, and PRATT, JJ.,
concur.
M O F F A T , Chief Justice (concurring).
I concur with the understanding that the
unlawful detainer action does not cut off
the right of the purchaser to bring suit to
have equities determined if he claims equities in his favor.
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tute a condition seriously detrimental to the
child.
HENRIOD, C. J., and WILKINS, J., concur.
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting):
The main opinion sets forth the essential
facts of this pitiable situation with commendable candor and completeness. The
trial judge appears to have given careful
and thoughtful consideration to all aspects
of the thorny problem it presents. His
statements, including that quoted in the
main opinion, indicate that he thinks there
is neither a happy nor even a satisfactory
solution; but that return of this unfortunately retarded child to this unfortunately
retarded and limited mother presents an
"impossible" situation, which would undoubtedly soon result in a renewal and continuation of the difficulties that have existed in the past, wherefore, the best solution
available is to leave the child where he is.
It is my judgment that if the facts are
looked at realistically in the light of the
basic rules we have often expressed in such
matters: that the paramount consideration
should be the welfare of the child; l and
that we should indulge considerable latitude
to the discretion of the trial court,2 there is
no basis shown to justify overturning his
findings and judgment. I would therefore
affirm them.
ELLETT, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Crockett.
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Carl L. PINGREE et a!., Plaintiffs,
Respondents, and Cross-Appellants,
V.

The CONTINENTAL GROUP OF UTAH,
INC., a Utah Corporation, and Leslie W.
Van Antwerp, Jr., aka L. A. Antwerp dba
Van's Blue Ox, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 14484.
Supreme Court of Utah
Dec. 22, 1976
Landlord brought action against assignee of lease seeking order declaring provision granting assignee option to renew
invalid for uncertainty or, in the alternative, decree declaring rental under renewal
option to be $900 per month and seeking
determination as to party responsible under
lease for installation of fire escape. The
Second District Court, Weber County, John
F. Wahlquist, J , entered judgment in favor
of landlord, and assignee appealed The
Supreme Court? Maughan, J , held that evidence supported award for repairs necessitated by assignee, that issue concerning
responsibility for installation of fire escape
was moot; that option to renew lease was
too vague and indefinite to be enforceable,
so that lease terminated and, under provision of lease, assignee became tenant on
month-to-month basis at amount equal to
prior monthly rental, that landlord was not
entitled to treble damages; and that assignee's refusal to vacate after service of
notice of forfeiture and notice to vacate
was wrongful and landlord was thus entitled to reasonable rental value of property
for period during which assignee wrongfully refused to vacate.
Affirmed, reversed in part, and remanded
1. Landlord and Tenant <&^154(3)
Evidence was sufficient to sustain
amount of award to landlord for cost of

1.

See Miller v Miller, 8 Utah 2d 290, 333 P 2d
945

2.

State in Interest ofK-.-B..
326 P 2d 395

, 7 Utah 2d 398,
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repairs for which assignee of lease was responsible
2. Landlord and Tenant o=> 152(4)
Where a tenant covenants to repair,
nature of alteration or improvement and
reason for requiring it determines responsibility for cost of compliance with health and
safety laws, so that if tenant is required to
make repairs which he would normally be
required to make under his covenant or if
alterations are required only because of
particular use to which tenant is making of
the premises, tenant should bear cost of
compliance, but landlord should bear cost of
compliance if ''structural" charges are required if they are not required because of
particular use made of premises by tenant.
3. Action <3=>6
Where lease assignee's particular use of
premises was reason that city directed that
fire escape be installed and where assignee
chose to stop activities necessitating fire
escape, issue as to whether landlord or assignee was responsible for installation of
fire escape was rendered moot.
4. Contracts ®=>9(1), 15
Condition precedent to the enforcement
of any contract is that there must be a
meeting of the minds of the parties, which
must be spelled out, either expressly or
impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be
enforced.
5. Landlord and Tenant <fc=»86(l), 115(3)
Where lease provided that tenant could
renew lease and that rental amount for
renewal period would be determined upon
negotiation in which parties would be required to consider taxes, costs of business,
business volume and success, insurance
costs and so forth, option to renew was too
vague and indefinite to be enforced and
lease terminated at end of initial term, so
that trial court erred in implying that parties had agreed on reasonable rental figure
and, under section of lease, assignee of
lease which held possession after expiration
of initial term became tenant on month-tomonth basis with rent at previous level.

6. Landlord and Tenant e=>291(14)
Landlord was not entitled to treble
damages for any unlawful detainer on the
part of assignee of lease where summons
was not in accordance with mandatory provisions of statute and complaint did not
include any claim of forfeiture or unlawful
detainer and where it was not until over
four months after forfeiture was declared
that landlord filed amended complaint
alleging unlawful detainer.
U.C.A.1953,
78-36-3(5), 78-36-8, 78-36-10.
7. Landlord and Tenant <3=>291(2)
Notice of forfeiture of lease is sufficient to terminate lease for breach of covenant, but it is not sufficient to place lessee
in unlawful detainer. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1
et seq., 78-36-3(5), 78-36-8.
8. Landlord and Tenant <s=>281, 286
Trial court properly determined that
lease assignee's refusal to vacate leased
premises after being served notice in which
landlord stated that it declared forfeiture
of lease for assignee's failure to correct
deficiencies in maintenance of premises was
wrongful and trial court properly awarded
landlord possession of property and damages for time assignee remained in possession at reasonable rental value.
9. Landlord and Tenant e=>286
Generally, damages recoverable when a
tenant wrongfully refuses to vacate after
service of notice of forfeiture and notice to
vacate are reasonable rental value of premises.
10. Landlord and Tenant <3==>231(8)
Evidence sustained trial court's finding
that reasonable rental value of premises
worth between $150,000 and $200,000 was
$900 per month.

Brian R. Florence, of Florence & Hutchison, Ogden, for defendants and appellants.
Edward P. Powell, of Christensen, Gardiner, Jensen & Evans, Salt Lake City, for
respondents.
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MAUGHAN, Justice:
On appeal is a judgment of the District
Court in an action for a Declaratory Judgment involving a lease, together with a
cross-appeal seeking treble damages for unlawful detainer.
We affirm, in part, reverse, in part; and
remand for elimination from the judgment
all sums included because of failure to construct the fire escape. No costs awarded.
Statutory references are to U.C.A.1953.
Plaintiffs, lessors of premises suitable for
use as a restaurant initially leased to The
Continental Group of Utah, Inc., hereafter
Continental. Continental's interest was assigned, with the lessor's consent, to Leslie
Van Antwerp, Jr., hereafter, defendant or
lessee. In their complaint, plaintiffs sought
an order declaring a provision granting lessee an option to renew, invalid for uncertainty. In the alternative, a decree declaring the rental under the renewal option to
be $900 per month, and a determination as
to the one responsible under the lease for
the installation of a fire escape.
Upon trial to the court, plaintiffs were
awarded judgment as follows: $4,000 damages for breach of the covenant to repair
and maintain the premises and for lessee's
failure to install a fire escape; $400 per
month additional rent commencing October
1, 1974, through February 1975; damages
for holdover of the premises from March 4,
1975, to January 15, 1976, in the sum of
$9,450, with offset of $5,000 paid during
this period ($90 per month reasonable rental
value); $5,000 attorney's fees; and a decree
terminating the lease and restoring possession.
Lessors and Continental, the initial lessees, executed a lease for a term of five
years, commencing October 1, 1969. The
lease provided the premises were rented in
an "as is" condition. The lessee covenanted, at his sole expense, to maintain the
exterior and interior of the building and
improvements on the premises, including
the roof, plumbing and electrical wiring,
air-conditioning, and heating equipment,
subject to reasonable wear and tear. Reserved rent was $500 per month, plus three

percent of the gross receipts, in excebS of
$10,000. Beginning in 1970, Continental
utilized the second floor of the premises for
banquets and parties. In January 1972, the
Fire Department of Roy City informed Continental this new use of the premises required the installation of a fire escape.
In May 1972, Continental, with lessor's
consent, assigned its leasehold interest to
defendant. A representative of Continental testified defendant was informed it was
his responsibility to install the fire escape,
and to repair the floor. The trial court
found defendant assumed all the rights and
obligations under the lease, and defendant
understood, at the time of the assignment,
the lease required him to do all maintenance; including changes made necessary
by the public authorities. Further, defendant assumed the obligation to repair and
maintain any condition which occurred during the occupancy of Continental.
By a letter of September 24, 1974, lessors
informed defendant of specific deficiencies
in his maintenance, and in their amended
complaint, they sought damages for breach
of the covenant. The trial court found
defendant had failed to make extensive repairs within the covenant. Plaintiffs were
awarded damages of $4,000 for defendant's
failure to repair and maintain the premises,
and to install the fire escape.
On appeal, defendant contends there was
insufficient evidence to sustain the finding
he was responsible for the damages awarded. However, with the exception of the
fire escape, the record does not sustain defendant's contentions.
A representative of defendant's predecessor, Continental, testified the building was
in good condition at the time defendant
took possession. The records of the Health
Department during 1974, indicated the need
for repair of the premises
Significantly,
defendant did not contradict the testimony
of Continental, to wit, he agreed he would
be responsible for the repairs and installation of the fire escape.
[1] Estimates of the cost of repairs were
adduced, and the court was of the view, if
the repairs were made, betterment would
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be the result There is no evidence m the
record to show the cost of the fire escape,
which was not included in the estimate of
repair of structural damage. The total estimate for repairs without the fire escape
was $4,564 The trial court did not allocate
the $4,000 for delayed maintenance and the
fire escape among the various cited deficiencies. However, since there is evidence
in the record to sustain the amount of the
award, (excepting the fire escape), the finding of the trial court is sustained.
It was found the City of Roy directed the
fire escape be installed, because of the use
being made of the premises by the lessee;
and defendant understood at the time of
the assignment, it was his duty to do all
maintenance; including changes made necessary by public authorities.
Defendant
testified he used the upstairs for banquets
and parties, which accounted for 10 to 20
percent of his business.
Gaddis v. Consolidated Freight ways,1 illuminates the several factors to be considered
in determining who should bear the cost of
compliance required by governmental authority, in order to conform the premises to
health and safety laws.
[2] The court quoted the following from
1 American Law of Property 353
Where the lessee covenants to repair,
the question of who should bear the cost
of compliance depends upon the nature of
the alteration or improvement and the
reason for requiring it. If the order involves mere repairs which the lessee
would normally be required to make under his covenant, he should bear the cost.
Likewise, the burden is on the lessee
where the alteration is required only because of the particular use which he is
making of the premises, although it may
be questioned whether even in this case,
the court would place the burden of extensive and lasting improvements on the
lessee, except perhaps where the lease is
1. 239 Or 553, 398 P 2d 749, 22 A L R 3d 514
(1965)
2.

See 22 A L R 3d 521, 539, Sec 8 "Where the
tenant covenants to repair and the alterations

for a long term At any rate, if the order
requires the making of such improvements, so-called "structural" changes, and
they are not required because of the particular use made of the premises by the
lessee, the lessor must bear the burden of
compliance
[3] In our matter, defendant had the
responsibility to install the fire escape, had
he continued to engage in activities which
required it. Defendant's particular use of
the premises was the reason the authorities
required the installation. 2 He was notified
no business license would be issued were he
to continue the prohibited use. Faced with
this ultimatum defendant chose to stop the
proscribed activities, thus rendering the fire
escape responsibility moot.
Defendant asserts error in the court's determination that, under the option to renew, $900 per month was a reasonable rental rate The lease contained the following
renewal provisions, which were drafted by
defendant's predecessor Continental*
The Lessee shall have and is hereby
granted the option to renew this lease for
two separate additional five-year terms,
commencing on the first month following
the expiration of the term of this lease
upon the same terms and conditions contained herein except that the rental
amount will be renegotiated; however,
maximum total monthly rental shall not
exceed $900.00 per month.
Factors of tax increase, costs of business increases or decreases, business volume and success, insurance costs and other reasonable allowances, will be the basis
for terms of negotiation.
Defendant gave lessors timely notice of
his exercise of the option to renew. Lessors
responded the new rental would be $900 per
month Defendant replied citing the factors of the lease and explaining his costs of
doing business had increased 81 per cent,
and his volume had decreased 24 per cent.
or improvements ordered by public authority
are ordered because of the particular use the
tenant makes of the premises, the tenant, and
not the landlord, has been held obligated "
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Defendant was willing to pay $500 per
month. Lessors based their demand on the
increase in taxes and insurance, interpreting the provision "and other reasonable allowances," as meaning they were entitled to
a fair return on their investment in the
premises. Evidence set the value of the
premises to be between $150,000 and $200,000.
The parties were unable to agree on the
rental rate for the renewal period—resulting in this action. Defendant urges, if the
factors set forth in the option were compared to his evidence, it clearly illustrates
error in setting the rent at $900 per month.
Plaintiffs cross-appeal, asserting the trial
court erred by not ruling the option for
renewal void and unenforceable, on the
ground it was too indefinite and vague.
[4] Plaintiffs' contention is correct. If
the factors are considered in view of the
defendant's evidence, a low rental is justified. If the factors are weighed in light of
plaintiff's evidence, the maximum rental
would be appropriate. From the factors
specified, a court cannot derive an objective
standard applicable to both parties; i. e.t
there is a material difference in the final
result (the renewal rate), when the factors
are analyzed in relationship to the position
of each party.
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract is that there be a
meeting of the minds of the parties,
which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced.
.3
Cited are the various rules of interpretation to support their positions. In Slayter
v. Pasley* the court in a scholarly opinion
set forth majority and minority rulings.
The majority rule, in essence, is that a
provision for the extension or renewal of
a lease must specify the time the lease is
to extend and the rate of rent to be paid
with such a degree of certainty and definiteness that nothing is left to future
determination. If it falls short of this
3.

Valcarce v. Bitters,
P.2d 427 (1961).

12 Utah 2d 61, 63, 362

requirement, it is not enforceable.
The court then explained the minority
rule has two divisions. In the first, the
provision is held enforceable if it clearly
establishes a mode for ascertaining the future rental rate, as by arbitration, or if
there is an express declaration for a reasonable rental during the extension period, or
other words or phrases; which clearly connote and are legally synonymous with reasonable rental. Under the second division
of the minority rule, the court implies a
mutual agreement for a reasonable rental.
[5] In the current matter, the court implied the parties had agreed on a reasonable
rental figure, which the court proceeded to
determine. This interpretation had the effect of nullifying the express factors specified by the parties, and substituting a new
agreement to which the parties had not
committed themselves.
To attempt by judicial fiat to substitute the legal concept of "reasonable
rental" in lieu of the previously followed
design of a fluctuating rental, measured
by future uncontrolled and uncontrollable
conditions, would, indeed, be to remake
the contract for the parties and very possibly frustrate what to us appears to be a
very important contrary intent concerning the rental amount. .
.5
The option to renew was too vague and
indefinite to be enforceable and the lease
terminated by its own terms as of September 30, 1974. Under Section 28 of the lease,
if the lessee holds possession after expiration of the term, he becomes a tenant on a
month-to-month basis in an amount equal
to the prior monthly payment. The court
erred in ordering defendant to pay an additional $400 per month rent from October 1,
1974, to March 5, 1975.
Plaintiffs' cross-appeal urging error in
not being awarded treble damages for defendant's unlawful detainer under 78 3 6 4.

199 Or 616, 264 P 2d 444, 446 (1953)

5.

Id

p 451 of 264 P 2d

1322

Utah

558 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

10 Defendant asserts this ruling of the
trial court should be sustained
Plaintiffs initially sent a letter to defendant on September 24, 1974, setting forth
deficiencies in the maintenance of the
premises. Plaintiffs stated, if the deficiencies were not corrected within thirty days,
"you are hereby notified of lessors intent to
forfeit, cancel and terminate this lease.
Later, there were several meetings between the parties and the repairs were discussed On February 26, 1975, plaintiffs
served notice on defendant, which stated
they "hereby declare a forfeiture" of the
lease for the lessee's failure to correct the
deficiencies set forth in the letter of September 24, 1974 The lessors informed lessee he was a tenant at will, and ordered him
to vacate the premises within five days.
Lessee was informed if he failed to vacate,
an unlawful detainer proceeding would be
commenced and he would be liable for treble damages.
On March 17, 1975, defendant was served
with summons and complaint, for the declaratory judgment action. The summons
was not in accordance with the mandatory
provisions of 78-36-8, and the complaint
did not include any claim of forfeiture or
unlawful detainer. It was not until July 21,
1975, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint,
alleging unlawful detainer
[6,7] In Gerard v. Young,6 this court
held that a plaintiff, to bring his case under
the Forcible Entry and Detainer statute,
must comply with the provisions of 78-368 For plaintiffs failure to comply with this
statute, the trial court properly ruled they
were not entitled to treble damages In
addition, plaintiffs' declaration of forfeiture
was not conditional as required by 78-363(5). This court has consistently ruled a
notice of forfeiture is sufficient to terminate a lease for breach of a covenant, but it
6.
7.

20 Utah 2d 30, 432 P 2d 343 (1967)
Jacobson v Suan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 68, 278 P 2d
294 (1954), Ensman v 0\erman, 11 Utah 2d
258, 358 P2d 85 (1961), Van Zyverden v Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P 2d 468 (1964), Fire-

is not sufficient to place the lessee in unlawful detainer. This for the reason the
statute requires an alternative notice, viz,
the tenant either perform, or quit; before
he can be held in unlawful detainer, and be
subject to treble damages.7
[8-10] The court was correct in its ruling that defendant's refusal to vacate was
wrongful, after the service of the notice of
forfeiture and to vacate on February 26,
1975. The amended complaint filed by
plaintiffs in July was a common law action
for ejectment. The court properly awarded
plaintiffs possession of the property, and
damages for the time defendant remained
in possession. Damages recoverable under
such circumstances are generally the reasonable rental value of the premises.8 The
reasonable rental value was found to be
$900 per month; such sum is sustained by
the evidence.
HENRIOD, C. J , and ELLETT, CROCKETT and WILKINS, J J , concur.
/w\
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

Kriste A. PITKIN, Plaintiff,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of
Utah and Preston's Incorporated,
Defendants.
No. 14588.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 30, 1976.
A workmen's compensation claimant
appealed from an order of the Industrial
Commission denying compensation. The
Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that there
man's Insurance Co v Brown v Fullmer, 529
P2d 419 (Utah 1974)
8. 32 A L R 2d 582, Anno Measure of damages
for tenant's failure to surrender possession of
rented premises, Sec 4, p 589

